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Sustainable Marine Resource Management: Lessons
from Viability Analysis ∗
J. Kropp a , K. Eisenacka , and J. Scheffrana
a

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
P.O. Box 601203
14412 Potsdam, Germany

Abstract: Marine natural resources are under pressure worldwide. Management and surveillance systems
are often inappropriate to guarantee a sustainable resource utilization since the knowledge on fisheries and/or
stocks is limited. Additionally, institutional failures, e.g. unsuitable regulatory policies, have accelerated resource exploitation in several cases. Modelling is often considered as a very effective tool for studying the
behaviour of complex systems, but a variety of difficulties arise if one has to deal with uncertain knowledge or
inhomogeneous data of different quality. In this paper we present a method that is capable both for (i) integration of sparse or limited knowledge from different disciplines and (ii) provides a test-bed for an assessement of
different management regimes.
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I NTRODUCTION

Following sustained interest from policy makers, recent years have seen a number of modelling efforts
examining the effects of commercial fisheries. The
issue is recognized as highly important, as stated
also by the FAO [2001]. In their report on the
state of world fisheries the FAO mentioned that 50%
of the world’s fish resources are fully exploited,
20% overexploited and 10% depleted. Even though
overfishing has been a fact since historical times
[Jackson et al., 2001] the problem has gained a
new quality due to the industrialization of fisheries.
The activities of highly capitalized fishing companies have reduced community biomass by 80%
within 15 years of exploitation [Myers and Worm,
2003]. In many cases the fishing industry can only
be sustained at an economic level by paying high
amounts of subsidies, while at the same time increased capitalization and efficiency put additional
pressure on the stocks [Banks, 1999; Gréboval and
Munro, 1999; Munro, 1999; Pauly et al., 2002;
Pauly, 2003]. As a consequence of this intricate situation an ongoing debate on adequate control and
management instruments is taking place. Especially
the following questions are discussed frequently:
1. Do fishery management strategies focus too
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kropp@pik-potsdam.de, Phone: +49-3312882526

much on the ecological system part, an approach sometimes coined “ichthyocentrism”
[Lane and Stephenson, 2000]?
2. How to deal with inherent uncertainties in
the dynamics of the fishing industry as well
as those of the fish stocks [Whitmarsh et al.,
2000]?
3. What are potential benefits and risks of
so-called co-management strategies [Potter,
2002]?

In our paper we address the issues mentioned above
by applying a technique which considers inhomogeneous and uncertain knowlege from the biological, economic and political domain. The framework
of viability theory [Aubin, 1991] can be used to assess management strategies and highlights the role
of fish stock estimates in the recommendations for
catch quota allocations. It allows normative sustainability criteria, e.g. for employment or environmental protection, to be included into systems
analysis. All possible trajectories can be computed
and checked concerning their properties violating
these normative settings or not. Analytical frameworks like this are used to an increasing extent in
sustainability sciences [Bene et al., 2001; Eisenack
and Kropp, 2001; Aubin and Saint-Pierre, 2004].

2

M ANAGEMENT R EGIMES IN F ISHERIES
AND M ODELLING M ETHODS

In this section we briefly introduce some concepts
from fishery management and viability theory.
Co-management is implemented to increase participation of fishermen in the management of marine resources [Jentoft et al., 1998; Charles, 2001]. By introducing a degree of responsibility for the resource,
it is expected that the compliance with regulations,
e.g. catch quota, gear type, etc., will be higher [Mahon et al., 2003]. This is in contrast to the prevalent
type of management, where a governmental authority imposes restrictions on the fishery. We refer to
this strategy as top-down management, since fishing firms have no direct influence on the regulatory
measures.
The problem of ichthyocentrism focuses on scientific institutions which play an essential part in both
management regimes. Typically, these institutions
provide biomass estimates which are an important
basis for catch restrictions or quotas. It is often
claimed that such an approach – in comparison to
research efforts on the behaviour of resource users –
puts too much emphasis on the resource itself. The
question is whether we need a deeper understanding of the fisheries as a whole, or if it is sufficient
to have better knowledge on the behaviour of fish
stocks.
Viability theory [Aubin, 1991] investigates whether
trajectories of a controlled dynamical system will
stay within a prescribed region of the phase space
given by the sustainability criteria (the so-called
constrained set). This allows management targets to
be formalized and takes into account the limitations
of knowledge. A trajectory respecting the criteria is
called viable or sustainable. However, not just a single trajectory is tested for viability, but the set of all
trajectories which result from possible control paths
(management decisions). The set of all initial conditions for which there exists at least one control path
keeping the resulting trajectory in the constrained
set forever is called the viablity kernel. The shape
of the kernel depends on the management regime,
and thus the approach can be used to identify sustainable management regimes.
3

T HE M ODEL

The change of biomass x of a fish stock depends
on the recruitment R(x) and the total catch h, given
by ẋ = R(x) − h. We study the fish stock above a

threshold x > 0 assuming that its density is sufficiently low to allow an accelerating growth if there
are no activities of fishing firms, i.e. ∀x > x :
R(x) > 0 and Dx R(x) > 0, where Dx denotes the
partial differential operator with respect to x. Below
x our knowledge about the recruitment behaviour is
uncertain, and therefore we ignore this part of the
phase space.
Co-management is exercised by a fishery council,
where representatives from different groups (fishing
firms, authorities, and scientific institutions) participate and negotiate about the allocation of catch quotas qi to the groups
P i = 1, . . . , n. The resulting total
harvest is h = i qi . When the members agree on
their quota, the decision of the council is approved
by a governmental authority. The resulting restrictions are executed by a management organization
which works in close collaboration with local fishermen. The negotiations are opened by the scientific institution, which provides a preliminary recommendation h0 for the total catch. Subsequently
each group of the fishing industry tries both (i) to
get a large share of the total harvest h and (ii) to
increase h above the catch recommendation h0 in
order to improve profits. The profit πi of group i depends on the quota qi and on the available amount of
fish x, which is the same for all fishing firms. It also
depends on the efficiency of boats, fishing gear and
technological equipment which varies between the
groups [Scheffran, 2000]. Furthermore deviation
costs di have to be considered which result from an
exceeding of the scientific recommendation. They
are due to public perception, the risk of being excluded from the co-management framework and a
stronger need for good public relations.
We define


Pn
.
πi (qi , x) = p qi − ci (qi , x) − di
q
−
h
j
0
j=1

Here, the market price p is assumed to be exogeneous. The cost function ci depends on a realized
harvest qi and the biomass of fish. It increases in qi
since more effort is needed for a larger catch, and
decreases in x dueP
to higher densities of the exploited stocks. If j qj − h0 becomes negative,
di vanishes because deviation costs do not come
into play if the sum of all quotas is below the scientific recommendation. It is reasonable to assume
that di is a monotonicly increasing function. Each
group of fishing firms can propose a quota allocation to obtain an optimal profit for a given price and
fish stock. At Nash equilibrium the quota allocation
assigns an individual quota qi to each group i that
maximizes πi with respect to qi for given p, x and
quotas of the other participants. Assuming that all
πi are concave and continuously differentiable with
respect to qi , the equilibrium is provided by solving

∀i = 1, . . . , n : Dqi πi = 0. In our analysis we
study the case of two fishery groups and specify ci
and di as
αi qi + βi qi2
ci (qi , x) :=
;
x
(
0 if q1 + q2 < h0
di (q1 +q2 −h0 ) :=
κi (q1 + q2 − h0 )2 otherwise.
The parameters αi , βi (i = 1, 2) are positive and
represent the technical efficiency. The political
power of each group i is expressed by the positive
parameter κi . Both functions are continuously differentiable (x is positive), and the resulting profit
functions πi are concave with respect to q1 , q2 . The
Nash equilibrium for given a p, x, h0 is obtained by
solving
1 q1
− 2κ1 (q1 + q2 − h0 ) = 0,
Dq1 π1 = p − α1 +2β
x
α2 +2β2 q2
Dq 2 π2 = p −
− 2κ2 (q1 + q2 − h0 ) = 0,
x
for q1 , q2 .
From this, the total harvest resulting from the negotiations evaluates to
upx + wxh0 − v
, (1)
h(x, h0 ) = q1 + q2 =
β1 β2 + wx
where u := 12 (β2 + β1 ) > 0, v := 21 (α1 β2 +
α2 β1 ) > 0, and w := β1 κ2 + β2 κ1 > 0. It is below
the profit optimum in the case of absent deviation
costs and above the initial scientific recommendation. The impact of h0 on h is
Dh0 h(x, h0 ) =

wx
> 0,
β1 β2 + wx

(2)

and
Dx h(x, h0 ) =

vw + (up + wh0 )β1 β2
> 0, (3)
(wx + β1 β2 )2

i.e. the negotiation equilibrium increases with the
abundance of fish. The difference between the
initial recommendation and total harvest increases

with abundance too, because Dx h(x, h0 ) − h0 =
Dx h(x, h0 ).
4

V IABILITY C ONSTRAINTS

For the assessment of recommendation strategies,
i.e. for controls h0 (t), we will specifiy sustainability criteria in the form of a constrained set (cf.
Sect. 2). We will emphasize that these criteria are
normative, i.e. they are not solely defined by scientists, but they are outcomes of the public debate which shall be analysed in this contribution.
Here, we exemplarily investigate the following constraints:

(i) Prevent a decline of the fish stock, i.e. the
condition ẋ ≥ 0 has to be fulfilled at any time.
(ii) Ensure that ∀t : x(t) ≥ x, i.e. that situation
exists with a relatively certain recruitment estimate.
(iii) Require a minimum harvest h covering fixed
costs and that employment and/or food safety
is sustained.
We rewrite ẋ = R(x) − h(x, h0 ), where R is monotonicly increasing for x ≥ x, and the function h has
the form given in eq. (1). Then, constraint (i) implies
h0 ≤

R(x)(wx + β1 β2 ) + v up
−
=: h̄0 (x). (4)
wx
w

Its differential is Dx h̄0 (x) =
Dx R(x) +

β1 β2 (xDx R(x) − R(x)) − v
. (5)
wx2

Observe that the expression may become negative. By definition, R(x) ≡ h(x, h̄0 (x)), and
therefore Dx R(x) ≡ Dx h(x, h̄0 (x)). This imx h(x,h0 )
plies that Dx h̄0 (x) = Dx R(x)−D
, where
Dh0 h(x,h0 )
Dh0 h(x, h0 ) > 0 (cf. eq. 2). If the negotiation
result h(x, h0 ) increases in x faster than the recruitment R(x), e.g due to high prices p (cf. eq. 3),
the maximal viable harvest recommendation h̄0 (x)
decreases in x.
For viability constraint (ii) it is sufficient that the
derivative ẋ is non-negative only for x = x, i.e.
h0 ≤ h̄0 (x). Constraint (iii) requires a minimum
harvest h at each time, yielding
h0 ≥

h(wx + β1 β2 ) + v up
−
=: h0 (x). (6)
wx
w

The partial derivative of h0 (x) with respect to x
1 β2 +v
simplifies to Dx h0 (x) = − hβwx
< 0. Thus,
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for increasing fish stocks lower initial recommendations can guarantee economic viability. Constraints
(ii) and (iii) hold at the same time if x > x and
h0 ≥ h0 (x), or if x = x and h0 (x) ≤ h0 ≤ h̄0 (x),
which implies h ≤ R(x). Hence, the compatibility of the viability constraints (ii) and (iii) depends
only on the recruitment function and the desired harvest. When recruitment at the minimum stock size
x is higher than the required harvest, there is no
contradiction between economic and ecological targets. Otherwise, when the stock attains x, it must
be decided whether to sacrifice conservation or harvest objectives. In the first case the viability kernel, i.e. the set of initial conditions allowing sustainable control, is the space {x | x ≥ x}, while
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Figure 1: Phase space representation for five possible outcomes of ichthyocentric control. The shaded areas
indicate the boundaries of the constrained set, the dashed lines represent possible “real world” realizations of
estimated recruitment R̃. The bold arrows indicate how the stock evolves. Note that the dashed lines provides
an additional information: the arrows signify the trajectories resulting from the corresponding recruitment
estimate. (a) corresponds to the case where R(x) > h, and (b) to R(x) < h.
in the second case the viability kernel is the subset
{x | x ≥ x̃}, where x̃ is defined by the unique solution of R(x̃) = h.
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A SSESSMENT
S TRATEGIES

OF

R ECOMMENDATION

Whilst the system remains in the viability kernel it is
possible to find harvest recommendations that guarantee viability forever. However, this does not imply
that such a strategy is necessarily chosen. We assess
whether this is the case for an ichthyocentric or for
a qualitative recommendation strategy (see below).
For the ichthyocentric strategy, the harvest recommendation h0 is assumed to be identical to the estimated recruitment R̃(x), assumed to be increasing
with x (for possible realizations of R̃(x), see Figure 1). We observe that under the presumption that
recruitment is estimated exactly (R = R̃), the fishery is exposed to a high risk:
The permanent endeavour of fishing companies during the negotiations to accomplish higher catch quotas has the consequence that the stock will necessarily decrease below x, since h(x, R(x)) > h̄0 (x),
and thus ẋ < 0.

Only in the cases of strongly underestimated recruitment (cases (1) and (3)) is the resource within safe
limits. For the cases (2) and (5) the recruitment is
overestimated leading to a decrease of stocks and a
violation of the ecological constraint. Finally, case
(4) partly overestimates and partly underestimates
the recruitment. Only if R(x) < h, a rapidly decreasing recruitment estimate leads to an economically non-sustainable state before the ecological criterion is violated.
The qualitative control strategy takes into account
uncertainties and is performed in the sense of qualitative reasoning concepts, where systems dynamics is only characterized in terms of thresholds and
trends [for details see, Kuipers, 1994; Kropp et al.,
2002]. Assume that the values of x, R, h0 and h̄0
are not exactly known, but that we can observe
whether x is decreasing or increasing and whether
the total catch h exceeds h or not. In such a situation a control rule can only contain qualitative directives implying an increase or decrease of h0 (see
Table 1). A fast change (rule #1) means that h0 is set
to a level where x increases instantaneously. If the
change is slow (rules #3 and #4), we only increase
the harvest recommendation if x has been increasing for a longer time. If rule #2 or #3 come into

rule #
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

observed situation
x decreases and h > h
x decreases and h < h
x increases and h < h
x increases and h > h

response
decrease h0 fast
decrease h0 fast
increase h0 slow
increase or
decrease h0 slow

0.25

h0
h0 ( x)
Ecological
viability
constraint

0.20

(1)

Table 1: Qualitative control strategy consisting of
four rules. If the surveillance authority, e.g. the scientific institution, observes the situation shown in
the second column it can provide policy advice as
indicated in the third column.

0.15

(4)

0.10

play, viability is already violated. Thus they have
to be interpreted as crisis management. In Figure 2
the regions corresponding to the different rules are
shown. They are separated by the graph of the function h̄0 (x) where ẋ = 0, and h0 (x) where h = h.
Horizontal arrows denote changes in the stock size
resulting from the recommendation h0 . Vertical arrows represent the reaction of the scientific institution. Trajectories evolve in the directions given by
the arrows. If rule #3 is applied the viability constraint (iii) is not fulfilled. Economic viability can
be achieved by increasing h0 and as a result region
(2) or (3) can be entered. Indeed, if stocks are at
a very low level and h0 increases too fast, region
(2) is more likely. Thus, an increase of h0 should
be slow, although this keeps the system economically unprofitable for a longer time. Otherwise a
sharp cut in harvests is necessary in order to avoid
the risk of crossing the threshold x. When region
(4) is approached, the associated rule prevents the
system from leaving it. In this region of the phase
space additional steering options are possible which
not only meet economic and ecological constraints,
but also allow a adjusted extension of the harvest in
order to improve the profits.
If catches decrease below h, rule #3 forces the system back. The same holds if catches increase too
strongly: when x starts to decrease, rule #1 forces
the system back to region (4). If h0 is far above
h̄0 (x) the decrease has to be fast to avoid a transition to region (2). For the same reasons h0 must be
changed slowly in region (4) to prevent it from exceeding h̄0 too much. The qualitative strategy is still
risky in region (1) if we do not reduce harvest recommendations fast enough. However, once region
(4) is entered, the qualitative strategy guarantees viable recommendations.
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C ONCLUSIONS

Management objectives in fisheries are rarely
achieved in practice and the debate on adequate
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Figure 2: Phase space portrait for qualitative control: The shaded lines represent the viability constraints, the dashed arrows indicate trajectories in
accordance with the control strategy. The numbers
correspond to the control rules (cf. Table 1, right
panel).

strategies is ongoing. Although it is not expected
that a unique solution exists, the need for crossdisciplinary analyses taking into account uncertainties still remains. Our analysis shows that the outcome of co-management regimes depend on biological, as well as on economic and political factors.
In particular, participatory management strategies,
such as co-management, are not per se sustainable
Recommendations purely based on the observation
of fish stocks expose the fishery to a high economic
and the resource to a high ecological risk. More
flexible strategies, e.g. based simply on qualitative
information on the state of the fishery, can guarantee minimum harvest levels and an increasing fish
stock.
In summary, much more research is needed, but
we hold that the presented methodology opens a
promising road towards a better understanding of
the intrinsic processes – including ecological, economic, and social issues – in fisheries. The viability
concept supply a valuable tool for risk assessments
in fisheries prone to non-sustainable developments.
Therefore, future work will be directed to the introduction of additional viability constraints focussing

on the profits realized by fishing firms and different
capital stocks.
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